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AVOIDING THE WOODSHED: THE THIRD CIRCUIT EXAMINES
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING
ARGUMENT IN UNITED STATES v. WOOD

"What Mr. Donnell is saying is he doesn't trust juries. Well, that's the
system of this country. And if it displeases him, perhaps he should move
to Cuba. "1

I.

INTRODUCTION

T

o be sure, comments such as this one are seldom heard as part of
closing arguments in American courtrooms. In modem criminal
cases, however, the closing argument is often viewed as the most important part of the trial, providing the attorneys with their last opportunity to
convince the jury of the defendant's guilt or innocence.2 Prosecutors especially place extraordinary weight on closing statements because they retain the burden of proof in the case. 3 Given this degree of significance,
prosecutors and defense counsel alike are generally afforded great leeway
regarding what they may say in closing arguments, as the opening quota4
tion demonstrates.
1. The Internet Movie Database: Memorable Quotes from "The Practice",
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118437/quotes (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
2. See Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 DICK. L. REv. 85, 113
(1994) (describing most modern theorists' approach to closing arguments as important to any trial).
3. See John B. Mitchell, Why Should the Prosecutor Get the Last Word?, 27 AM. J.
CRiM. L. 139, 140-41 (2000) (noting general agreement that party who bears burden of proof should get last opportunity to convince jurors of defendant's guilt).
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor must receive the
first opportunity to deliver a closing argument, and then retain the chance to give
a rebuttal argument after defense counsel has delivered a summation. See FED. R.
CRiM. P. 29.1 (2002) (mandating that government gives its closing argument first,
followed by defense, and that government gives final rebuttal).
4. See Rosemary Nidiry, Note, RestrainingAdversarial Excess in ClosingArgument,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1299 (1996) (observing that "final argument of a trial is
often viewed as a legal battleground in which almost anything goes") (quoting
Bradley R. Johnson, Closing Argument: Boom to the Skilled, Bust to the Overzealous, 69
FLA. B.J. 12, 12 (1995)). Because of the combative adversarial nature of the American judicial system, there have been numerous comparisons of trials-and particularly of closing arguments-to battlegrounds and wartime strategy. See id. (same);
see also Hansen v. United States, 299 F. 593, 594 (9th Cir. 1924) (comparing parties' conduct to behavior of those individuals who had recently died in battle);
Moody v. Ford Motor Co., 506 F. Supp. 2d 823, 835 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (noting
attorney's closing argument that sale of ten thousand Ford Explorers caused ten
thousand deaths per year, which was likened to rising number of military deaths in
Iraq); Lawhorn v. Haley, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1200 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (holding
attorney's comparison of jury's duty to that of wartime soldier constituted improper argument), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F.3d 1272 (11th
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The importance of closing arguments is perhaps most notable in the

context of sentencing hearings in capital cases. 5 Thejury has already been
given the unenviable task of deciding whether to sentence a defendant to
death or to recommend a death sentence, and the prosecutor's argument
can reassure uneasy jurors with respect to the monumental job before
them. 6 One common way that prosecutors reassure the jury is to explain
the role that appellate courts play in the capital sentencing process. 7 The
theory behind this reassurance technique is that jurors who understand
the appellate process will be more comfortable sentencing a person to
death, because they know that their decision will be reviewable by a more

influential court with experience in scrutinizing death sentences. 8 Surely,
however, an ethical dilemma arises when making such an argumentprosecutors are supposed to minimize arguments that prey on the mindsets and tendencies of individual jurors. 9
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of prosecutorial remarks
in closing argument several times in reviewing the validity of capital
sentences and habeas petitions. 10 The Third Circuit has applied the SuCir. 2008); Thorsen v. City of Chicago, 392 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(discussing closing argument and noting that "partisanship and heat of battle inherent in a lawsuit militate in favor of granting a certain latitude to attorneys in
representing their clients") (emphasis added).
5. See Welsh White, CurbingProsecutorialMisconduct in Capital Cases: Imposing
Prohibitions on Improper Penalty Trial Arguments, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1147, 1149
(2002) (stressing importance of prosecutors' closing statements in penalty phases
of capital trials because of arguments' context). As in most trials decided solely on
the merits, most penalty hearings allow prosecutors to give their closing argument
first and then provide a rebuttal argument to the defense's statement. See id.
(describing generally preferred order of arguments in penalty hearings).
6. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333 (1985) (recognizing that jury's
role in capital sentencing determination is fraught with discomfort). In his majority opinion in Caldwell, Justice Marshall characterized the jury's determination as
being considered "on behalf of the community." See id. (same). Jurors' discomfort
might be further derived from having limited guidance "as to how their judgment
should be exercised, leaving them with substantial discretion." Id.
7. See Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 628 n.7 (5th Cir. 1986) (recounting
prosecutor's explanation to jury of appellate review process that would take place
should jury impose death penalty). In Wheat, the prosecutor not only expounded
in detail upon the appellate process in capital cases for the jury, but also remarked:
'Just remember this, if your verdict is that of the death penalty, that's not final."
Id. For further discussion of similar remarks made in closing arguments concerning the apparent lack of finality of a jury verdict, see infra notes 32-58 and accompanying text.
8. See Commonwealth v. Jasper, 737 A.2d 196, 196 (Pa. 1999) (observing that
court's jury instructions emphasized that different appeals courts would conduct
"thorough" review of jury's verdict).
9. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 35.8(c) (3d ed. 1993) ("The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to
appeal to the prejudices of the jury.").
10. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323 (determining validity of capital sentence issued to defendant in light of prosecutorial comments during closing argument);
see also Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 6 (1994) (considering whether evidence
and jury instructions impermissibly shifted jury's sense of responsibility for its job
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preme Court's framework to similar prosecutorial remarks during the penalty phase in a capital trial.I' Recently, in United States v. Wood,12 the Third
Circuit addressed remarks made by prosecutors during the closing argument in a non-capital trial. 13 Despite the non-capital nature of the case,
the decision in Wood represents a potential willingness on the part of the
Third Circuit to extend the Supreme Court's framework for referring to
to similar
the appellate process during closing arguments in capital cases
14
remarks made during closing arguments in non-capital cases.
This Casebrief examines the Third Circuit's approach to evaluating
prosecutorial remarks about the appellate process during closing argument. 15 Part II of this Casebrief reviews the relevant Supreme Court precedent and discusses the "invited response doctrine," a justification that
prosecutors frequently offer for making certain remarks during closing argument. 16 Part III analyzes the Wood decision and explores the Third Circuit's readiness to extend the established law to the realm of non-capital
cases. 17 Part IV discusses the impact Wood may have on closing arguments
within the Third Circuit and offers brief suggestions to prosecutors pracduring sentencing hearing); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 817 (1991) (noting
prosecutor's statement evoking significant emotion in jurors' eyes and determining whether such commentary altered jury's sense of its own responsibilities);
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 230 (1990) (noting that issue in case concerned
comments made by prosecutor in closing argument during sentencing phase of
trial); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986) (considering effect prosecutor's statement regarding appellate process had on jury's sense of its own role);
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 638 (1974) (discussing defendant's contention that prosecutor's remarks during closing argument improperly swayed jury
and deprived defendant of fair trial); cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425
(1976) (discussing prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument as typical
issue with which judges tend to struggle in actions for post-trial relief).
11. SeeRileyv. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 294 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (addressing
defendant's assertion that prosecutor made inappropriate remarks concerning
jury's "sense of responsibility in the sentencing process"). For a more complete
description of Riley and its holding, see infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
12. 486 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2007).
13. For a detailed analysis of the Wood decision and its alignment with relevant law in the area of prosecutorial misconduct, see infra notes 74-130 and accompanying text.
14. For further discussion of why the Wood opinion indicates the Third Circuit's readiness to extend Caldwell to non-capital cases, see infra notes 124-42 and
accompanying text.
15. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of remarks made by
prosecutors during closing argument that concern the appellate process, see infra
notes 97-130 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the proper standard of review for potential
prosecutorial misconduct in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the relevant Supreme Court and Third Circuit cases that developed the framework for consideration of prosecutorial
remarks during closing argument and the legitimacy of certain prosecutorial strategies for making these remarks, see infra notes 32-73 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the holding in United States v. Wood and the Third
Circuit's approach to extending capital case precedent to non-capital cases, see
infra notes 74-130 and accompanying text.
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ticing under Third Circuit purview. 18 Finally, Part V briefly considers potential changes in prosecutorial closing argument strategy following the
19
Wood decision.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE ESTABLISHED FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
IMPROPER REFERENCES TO THE APPELLATE FUNCTION IN
CLOSING ARGUMENTS

A.

The Standard of Review for ProsecutorialMisconduct in the Third Circuit

It is well-settled in the Third Circuit that during the closing argument,
attorneys must refrain from making seditious comments or attacks on the
opposing advocate. 20 A prosecutor's remarks taken alone, however, do
not automatically constitute misconduct. 2 1 In fact, if evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming, a court does not generally reverse a defendant's conviction despite any potential prosecutorial misconduct
22
during the trial.
In the Third Circuit, an appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review when considering whether there has been
18. For a discussion of the impact of the Wood decision on remarks prosecutors may make about the appellate process during closing arguments, see infra
notes 131-33 and accompanying text. For suggestions to prosecutors given the
Wood decision, see infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the prosecutor's role in light of Wood, see infra notes
143-50 and accompanying text.
20. See United States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[N]o lawyer
may make 'unfounded and inflammatory attacks on the opposing advocate."' (citing Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Isaac, 50 F.3d 1175, 1185 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995))). The
Rivas court, however, qualified that statement by accepting the government's
counter-argument that it is perfectly acceptable to attack an opposing advocate's
arguments and trial tactics. See id. at 139 (discussing government's response to
rule in Isaac forbidding unfounded attacks on opposing advocate and agreeing
with this contention). In fact, a major purpose of closing argument is "attacking
and exposing flaws in one's opponent's arguments." See id.; see also United States v.
Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 213 (3d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between arguments aimed
at opposing counsel's tactics and those aimed at opposing counsel's character);
James H. Seckinger, ClosingArgument, 19 Am.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 51, 70 (1995) (advising trial attorneys to move directly to attacking opponent's arguments and case
strategies after providing their side of controversy). But see Michael J. Ahlen, The
Need for Closing Argument Guidelines inJury Trials, 70 N.D. L. REv. 95, 102 (1994)
(cautioning that stepping from attacking arguments and tactics to attacking opposing attorney's character is very easy). Ahlen sees attacking a particular attorney's
tactics as essentially attacking that attorney in public. See id. (describing effects of
too harshly attacking arguments and tactics).
21. See Scott W. Bell, ProsecutorialMisconduct, 88 GEO. L.J. 1408, 1408 (2000)
("[T]he relevant question is whether the prosecutor's comments 'so infected the
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."'
(quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986))) (internal quotation
omitted).
22. See Bell, supra note 21, at 1408 (noting courts' general refusal to overturn
conviction based solely on apparently improper prosecutorial remarks).
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prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. 23 The court must first be
convinced that the prosecution actually engaged in misconduct before it
can review the disputed comment's effect on the trial. 2 4 Once the court is
so convinced, the court balances the prejudicial effect of the misconduct
against several different factors that tend to negate the prejudice stemming from the improper statements in the closing argument. 25 Such factors include: the amount of evidence presented against the defendant,
whether the trial judge issued a curative instruction to the jury and
whether the prejudicial statement appeared to have a cumulative effect on
the jury. 26 If the appellate court finds that the misconduct's prejudice
outweighs the corrective nature of these factors, the court may determine
that the misconduct denied the defendant due process and that the trial
27
court abused its discretion by failing to order a mistrial.
23. See United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1365 (3d Cir. 1991) (providing proper standard of review in cases of potential prosecutorial misconduct); see
also United States v. Hakim, 344 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting appellate
review of trial court's refusal of mistrial is for abuse of discretion).
24. See Rivas, 493 F.3d at 139 (holding that court needed to be convinced of
prosecutorial misconduct before being able to rule on whether court abused discretion in failing to order mistrial). In Rivas, the defendant argued that the prosecutor had "'impugned' the 'function and dignity of defense counsel"' during
closing argument when he told the jury that defense counsel's job was "to take
your focus off the issue." See id. The Third Circuit held that such an argument was
not improper in the context of the trial. See id. (holding that closing argument
remark failed to pass abuse of discretion standard for prosecutorial misconduct).
25. Cf id. at 140 (balancing closing argument remark against other important
actions taken by trial court as well as weight of evidence to determine that mistrial
was unnecessary). But see Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial
Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1086
(1994) (arguing that appellate courts favor prosecutors in large part and stressing
government's ability to argue successfully that prosecutor's remarks at trial constitute harmless error). Morton argued that prosecutors have been undertaking a
"growing disregard" for the "ethical mandate of the legal profession." See id. (discussing lack of ethical responsibility pervading mindsets of prosecutors); see also
United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (noting increasing number of complaints being lodged by citizens regarding potential misconduct
by attorneys).
26. See Bell, supra note 21, at 1408-10 (listing factors to be weighed when evaluating prosecutor's statement for misconduct and conviction reversal). A combination of the three factors may suffice to ensure that no violation of due process
has taken place, and thus no need for reversal exists. See id. at 1410 (extending
analysis to include potential for factors to combine together).
27. See id. at 1408 (noting due process violation occurs when court fails to
properly consider circumstances surrounding prosecutorial misconduct). State
courts have devised a standard similar to the one used by the Third Circuit to
evaluate potential misconduct during prosecutors' closing arguments. See, e.g.,
Claire Gagnon, Note, A Liar By Any Other Name? Iowa's Closing Argument Conundrum, 55 DRAKE L. REv. 471, 477 (2007) (noting that Iowa's standard for evaluating
due process claims stemming from potential misconduct in closing argument requires prosecutor's conduct to result in enough prejudice to deny defendant fair
trial); TaraJ. Tobin, Note, MiscarriageofJustice During ClosingArguments By an Overzealous Prosecutor and a Timid Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 45 S.D. L. REv. 186,
216 (2000) (observing that South Dakota courts find due process violation has
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As previously stated, trial courts normally afford substantial deference
to prosecutors making their closing arguments. 28 The court's deferential
approach, however, is subject to limitations that tend to restrict the substance of what the prosecutor is permitted to argue. 29 As a general rule,
the Supreme Court has stated that prosecutors should "refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction."3 0 In addition, the American Bar Association has promulgated several prosecutorial
summation standards that effectively limit what a prosecutor may choose
3
to argue in closing. '

B.

The Appellate Process in Capital Closing Arguments:
Caldwell v. Mississippi and Progeny

1.

The Caldwell Rule
In the 1985 case of Caldwell v. Mississippi,3 2 the Supreme Court ana-

lyzed "whether a capital sentence is valid when the sentencing jury is led to
believe that responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death
sentence rests not with the jury but with the appellate court which later
occurred only after court first determines that prosecution engaged in
misconduct).
28. For further discussion of the substantial deference normally afforded to
attorneys during closing argument, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
29. See Nidiry, supra note 4, at 1306 (noting several limitations on closing argument procedure for attorneys). An important limitation on closing argument is
that an attorney may not argue facts that were not properly admitted into evidence
during the trial. See id. (stressing that attorney may discuss properly admitted facts,
which may include credibility, "probity" of evidence and "application of the law").
The attorney is also "not permitted to assert [his or] her personal beliefs or opinions as to the weight of the evidence, and is prohibited from inflaming or prejudicing the jury." See id. at 1307-08; see also State v. Wickes, 805 A.2d 142, 150 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2002) (affirming that attorneys are prohibited from interjecting personal
opinions on witness credibility).
30. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

31. See ABA

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION

3-

5.8(a)-(d) (3d ed. 1993) (providing limitations on closing arguments for prosecutors). In practice, the standards operate to prevent the prosecutor from making
impassioned statements to juries and to keep arguments focused on the evidence
that has been heard in court. See id. (same). The regulations are as follows:
(a) In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. The prosecutor should
not intentionally misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the
inferences it may draw.

(b) The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt
of the defendant.
(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to
the prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert
the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.

Id.
32. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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reviews the case."' 3 In Caldwell, the defendant had been convicted of capital murder under Mississippi law and thus faced a jury in a sentencing
hearing, who could impose a death sentence. 34 Caldwell's attorneys argued fervently for mitigation and offered evidence at the hearing of their
client's "youth, family background, and poverty" in order to appeal to the
35
jury.
In response to these contentions, the Assistant District Attorney
"sought to minimize the jury's sense of the importance of its role."3 6 In a
forceful argument, the prosecutor excoriated the defense's remarks and
conduct during closing argument. 37 The prosecutor then went on to tell
the jury: "Your job is reviewable. [The defense] know[s] it."38 Over a defense objection, the court allowed the prosecutor to make the statement
33. Id. at 323.
34. See id. at 324 (discussing defendant's crime, conviction and subsequent
sentence). The defendant committed his actions during the course of robbing a
small grocery store. See id. (describing circumstances of defendant's murder
conviction).
35. See id. (describing mitigating evidence); see also Michael A. Mello, Taking
Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitutionality of Capital Statutes that Divide
Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge andJury, 30 B.C. L. REv. 283, 291 (1989) (noting remarks made in defense counsel's closing argument designed to stress "gravity
and responsibility" of sentencing defendant to death). The following are those
closing remarks made by the defense attorney to the sentencing jury:
[E]very life is precious and as long as there's life in the soul of a person,
there is hope. There is hope, but life is one thing and death is final. So I
implore you to think deeply about this matter. It is his life or death-the
decision you're going to have to make, and I implore you to exercise your
prerogative to spare the life of Bobby Caldwell.... I'm sure [the prosecutor is] going to say to you that Bobby Caldwell is not a merciful person,
but I say unto you he is a human being. That he has a life that rests in
your hands. You can give him life or you can give him death. It's going to
be your decision. I don't know what else I can say to you but we live in a
society where we are taught that an eye for an eye is not the solution....
You are the judges and you will have to decide his fate. It is an awesome
responsibility, I know-an awesome responsibility.
Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 324. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist characterized these arguments as a "plea for mercy." See id. at 345 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing defense's closing argument).
36. Id. at 325 (majority opinion).
37. See id. (discussing prosecutor's remarks in response to defendant's contentions in closing argument). Among other things, the prosecutor noted his
"complete disagreement" with the defense's closing argument and, at several
points, called into question the fairness of the defense's interpretations of the sentencing jury's role in the case:
I'm in complete disagreement with the approach the defense has taken. I
don't think it's fair. I think it's unfair. I think the lawyers know better.
Now, they would have you believe that you're going to kill this man and they
know-they know that your decision is not the final decision. My God,
how unfair can you be?
Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id. At this point, defense counsel objected to this statement as being out
of order. See id. (noting defense objection to prosecutor's statement during
closing).
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on the condition that the Government explained to the jury that capital
sentences receive automatic review in the federal system. 39 The jury eventually sentenced Caldwell to death; the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
40
the prosecutor's remarks.
Writing for a plurality of four justices, Justice Marshall concluded that
the sort of prosecutorial argument that had been made in Caldwell "depicted the jury's role in a way fundamentally at odds with the role that a
capital sentencer must perform." 4 ' In the words of Justice Marshall, the
fact that appellate review existed for capital sentence determinations was
"wholly irrelevant" to the sentencing jury's evaluation process. 42 As a result, Caldwell announced the rule that in closing arguments, the jury must
43
not be misled with regard to the role it plays in the sentencing decision.
The plurality found that the prosecutor's comment in Caldwell's case violated this rule because the comment confused the jury's idea of its role;
accordingly, the plurality overturned Caldwell's death sentence and remanded the case. 44 Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in
which she expressed her view that providing accurate and non-misleading
information to the jury about its role is relevant to the jury's sentencing
45
decision.
39. See id. at 325 (noting that trial court directed prosecutor to clarify statements made, in order to avoid juror confusion).
40. See id. at 324, 326 (pronouncing death sentence as handed down by Mississippi sentencing jury). The sentence was upheld by the Mississippi Supreme
Court; although the vote on the court was 4-4, the tied vote meant that the sentence was to be affirmed. See id. at 326 (noting Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling
on defendant's sentence).
41. Id. at 336.
42. See id. (finding that appellate review had no place injury's deliberations).
43. See id. (noting inaccuracy and misleading nature of prosecutor's arguments to jury); see also Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994) (noting Supreme Court's reading of Caldwell rule to forbid those comments that "mislead the
jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less
responsible than it should for the sentencing decision" (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 n.15 (1986))). In Romano, the defendant argued that the
prosecutor's introduction into evidence of defendant's prior death sentence undermined the sentencing jury's idea of its responsibility in the trial. See Romano,
512 U.S. at 9 (discussing defendant's argument for why Caldwell rule applied to his
case). The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, holding that this evidence had
not affirmatively misled the jury about its role. See id. at 10 (concluding that jury
retained proper sense of its responsibility after having been privy to questionable
evidence).
44. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 341 (concluding that prosecutor's comments had
detrimental effect on jury's sense of its own responsibilities).
45. See id. at 342 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stressing importance in Caldwell's case that prosecutor provided jury with improper and inaccurate information regarding its role). O'Connorjoined most of Marshall's opinion in Caldwellshe wrote separately only to express differing views with regard to one portion of
Marshall's opinion. See id. at 341 (noting O'Connor's joining of plurality opinion
except for Part IV-A). As her position gave the court its majority, her opinion as to
the giving of "non-misleading and accurate" information is considered technically
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Caldwell's Development and the Third Circuit'sApplication of the
Caldwell Rule

Eight years after Caldwell, the Court clarified its decision in that case
in light of different state procedures in capital trials in the case of Romano
v. Oklahoma.46 In Romano, Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Caldwell as controlling, and relied on
past case law to hold that in order "to establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law." 4 The Third Circuit has
adhered to Rehnquist's conclusion in Romano, and has applied it to capital
48
cases within its jurisdiction.
In Riley v. Taylor,4 9 the Third Circuit considered the appeal of a defendant who sought to overturn his death sentence with a Caldwell argument.50 A Delaware court had convicted Riley of felony murder,
controlling. See id. at 342 (same); see also Romano, 512 U.S. at 9 ("As Justice
O'Connor supplied the fifth vote in Caldwell, and concurred on grounds narrower
than those put forth by the plurality, her position is controlling."). Justice Marshall's opinion, however, is most frequently cited as the authoritative one from
Caldwell; in his dissent, Justice Rehnquist referred to Marshall's opinion as "the
Court['s]" several times. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 343, 345-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting frequent use of term "the Court" in characterizing plurality's
remarks).
46. See Romano, 512 U.S. at 7 (observing that different states use different procedures for guilt and penalty phases of capital trials). The Court recognized that
"the States enjoy their traditional latitude to prescribe the method by which those
who commit murder shall be punished." Id. (quoting Blystone v. Pennsylvania,
494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990)). Expounding upon this position, the Romano majority
noted that the Court has long been concerned with the procedures used by states
to carry out death sentences. See id. at 8 ("[T]he Court's principal concern has
been more with the procedureby which the State imposes the death sentence ...
once it has been determined that the defendant falls within the category of persons eligible for the death penalty." (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,
999 (1983))).
47. Id. at 9 (quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)) (emphasis
added).
48. See Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 295 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (adopting
Romano's holding as controlling precedent in Third Circuit). For further discussion of the decision in Riley, see infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
49. 277 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2001).
50. See id. at 294 (explaining that defendant had made Caldwell claim). Riley
was presented to the Third Circuit as a habeas petition, which allowed the court to
review Riley's claims under a plenary standard of review. See id. (providing plenary
review for defendant's Caldwell claim). Because the case was presented in the
habeas context, Delaware law controlled the case under the Romano restriction. See
id. at 296 (discussing applicability of Delaware law); see also Romano, 512 U.S. at 7
(holding that Caldwell must be applied to local rules for capital trials). As such,
Riley's case came up through the Delaware courts; the Delaware Supreme Court
had rejected Riley's claims, and the district court had also denied Riley habeas
relief. See Riley, 277 F.3d at 294 (summarizing other courts' determinations of
Riley's contentions).
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intentional murder and various charges associated with the killings. 5 1
During the penalty phase of Riley's trial, the prosecutor made the following remark that caused Riley's attorney to object:
Let me say at the outset that what you do today is automatically reviewed
by our Supreme Court and that is why there is an automatic review on the

death penalty. That is why, if you return a decision of death . . .
you will receive and have to fill out a two-page interrogatory that
the Court will give you.... [T]his goes to the Supreme Court. That is

why it is concise and we believe clear and it should be looked
52
carefully on and answered appropriately.
Writing for an en banc court, Third Circuit Judge Dolores Sloviter
concluded that the prosecutor's comments in Riley constituted a Caldwell
violation. 53 In so concluding, the majority in Riley adopted the position
that "[f]or the jury to see itself as advisory when it is not, or to be comforted by a belief that its decision will not have effect unless others make
54
the same decision, is a frustration of the essence of the jury function."
The majority in Riley found that the prosecutor's statement "was misleading as to the scope of appellate review" in Delaware. 55 Important to
its opinion was the fact that 'jurors who are unconvinced that death is the
appropriate punishment but who are eager to send a message of disapproval for the defendant's acts might be very receptive to the prosecutor's
56
assurance that [they] can ... err because the error may be correctable."
Toward the end of her opinion, Judge Sloviter rejected the notion that the
mere brevity of the prosecutor's questionable remarks should somehow
51. See id. at 271 (summarizing Riley's convictions that led to penalty phase of
his trial). In addition to the murder convictions, Riley had been convicted of first
degree robbery, possession of a deadly weapon during a felony and second degree
conspiracy. See id. (same).
52. Id. at 296 (emphasis added). During argument before the court, the State
conceded that this statement did not differ from the one adjudged unconstitutional by the Court in Caldwell See id. (discussing Government's argument that
when "you compare the two [arguments], they are pretty much alike"). The court
did, however, recognize that the attorney's argument was technically correct because Delaware law provided for automatic review of Riley's death sentence by the
Delaware Supreme Court. See id. (explaining relevant Delaware review provision).
53. See id. at 299 (announcing majority holding in case and issuing writ of
habeas corpus).
54. Id. at 297 (quoting Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1282 (5th Cir. 1989)).
In Sawyer, the prosecutor told the jury that "you yourself will not be sentencing
Robert Sawyer to the electric chair." See Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1296 (King, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). Writing for the majority in Riley, Judge Sloviter adopted
the Sawyer court's rationale. See Riley, 277 F.3d at 296 (citing Sawyer's framework).
55. Id.

56. Id. at 296-97. For further discussion of why a prosecutor might want to
explain the role the appellate process plays in capital sentencing determinations,
see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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mitigate their harm. 5 7 Instead, Judge Sloviter noted that the comments
were the first the prosecutor had made to the jury at sentencing, and concluded that "[a] statement does not have to be lengthy to be effective in
suggesting to the jury that ultimate responsibility for sentencing lies
58
elsewhere.
3.

The Invited Response Doctrine

In order to avoid potential Caldwellviolations, prosecutors often claim
that their comments fall within the protections of the "invited response
doctrine. ' 59 The invited response doctrine responds to a common situation: defense counsel makes an improper argument and provokes the
60
prosecutor to respond with his or her own potentially improper remark.
The Supreme Court has held that this type of prosecutorial argument is
allowable in the appropriate context. 6 1 The Court has noted that "the
remarks must be examined within the context of the trial to determine
62
Imwhether the prosecutor's behavior amounted to prejudicial error."
portantly, however, the doctrine does not excuse a prosecutor's improper
comments in closing arguments, but rather evaluates the effect of the
comments on the trial taken as a whole. 63 Therefore, a court must take
into account the "probable effect the prosecutor's response would have on
64
the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly."
The Third Circuit allows prosecutorial use of the invited response
doctrine when the comments at issue are reasonable responses to defense
57. See id. at 298 (dismissing notion that simple fact that objectionable remarks to jury were "brief" could excuse them from potential Caldwell violation).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Velasquez, 322 F.3d 868, 874 (5th Cir.
2003) (recognizing invited response doctrine invoked by Government after defense counsel had made first combative comment in closing argument); United
States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 285 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that Government invoked invited response doctrine to justify remarks made at closing argument after defense counsel had asserted that government witnesses had lied);
United States v. Richardson, 130 F.3d 765, 778 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting Government's contention that controversial prosecutorial argument was made in response
to defense suggestion during heated trial exchange), vacated on other grounds, Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
60. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (commenting that situation where defense attorney makes controversial argument and prosecutor responds with own controversial remark has become commonplace in criminal
trials).
61. See generally Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359 (1958) (affirming
conviction on ground that potentially improper argument by prosecutor was justified on basis of invited response doctrine).
62. Young, 470 U.S. at 12 (citing Lawn, 355 U.S. at 339).
63. See id. at 13 (explaining appropriate standard for use of invited response
doctrine and evaluating invocations of rule); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 168, 182 (1986) (explaining that invited response is not to be used as excuse
for improper comments, but as method for examining resulting effect on trial).
64. Young, 470 U.S. at 12.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: p. 689

contentions. 65 A prosecutor may utilize the doctrine in a "defensive" manner when defense counsel has specifically attacked the prosecution in
some form. 66 The prosecution may not, however, invoke the doctrine in
an "offensive" fashion; that is, it cannot use invited response as a "springboard for launching affirmative attacks" on defense counsel and individual
67
defendants.
In United States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics,Inc., 68 the Third Circuit recognized
that the invited response doctrine is only proper in situations where the
prosecutor has been personally attacked and such an attack was not supported by evidence at trial. 69 In Dispoz-O-Plastics, the Government's com65. See United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 186 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998)
("[W] here a prosecutorial argument has been made in reasonable response to improper tactics by defense counsel . . . the need for a new trial [may be obviated]."
(quoting United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1126 (3d Cir. 1990))). The
premise upon which the Third Circuit has based its reading of the doctrine is that
"the unfair prejudice flowing from the two arguments may balance each other
out," which then greatly reduces any need for a new trial, See id.(providing ration-

alization for use of invited response doctrine for argument within Third Circuit).
66. See United States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir.
1999) (allowing defensive use of invited response doctrine). In Pungitore,the prosecutor had made several remarks about his own witnesses after defense counsel
had vigorously argued that state and federal government officials had conspired to
fabricate the witnesses' testimony. See 910 F.2d at 1123 (noting prosecutorial statements regarding integrity of both witnesses and government attorneys after both
had been questioned during defense closing arguments). The Third Circuit held
that the statements, although potentially improper if considered on their own, fell
squarely within the invited response doctrine. See id. (concluding that improper
prosecutorial comments did not require reversal of defendant's conviction due to
proper invited response invocation). The prosecutor's comments had been made
in response to what "amounted to a personal attack on virtually every government
official involved in this case, including members of the prosecutorial team." Id. at
1127, The court went on to note that the district court should have given closer
supervision to the defense's improprieties at trial. See id. (recognizing trial parties'
potential role in curbing improper defense arguments). It also noted that a timely
government objection to the defense's comments may have eliminated its own
need to resolve the issue. See id. (same).
67. See Dispoz-O-Plastics,172 F.3d at 284 (recognizing prohibition on offensive
prosecutorial use of invited response doctrine). For further discussion of the holding in Dispoz-O-Plasticsand a description of why invited response was invoked, see
infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
68. 172 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 1999).
69. See id. at 285 (noting that use of invited response doctrine is generally
limited to situations where prosecution is attacked for no apparent reason); see also
Pungitore,910 F.2d at 1127 (identifying personal attacks made on prosecutors and
law enforcement officers by defense counsel). Often, invited response comes into
play when defense attorneys make personal attacks on prosecutors for what they
believe to be the government's attempt to elicit perjury from witnesses. See United
States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting prosecutor's comment made at suggestion that he had suborned perjury from witness); United
States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1364-66 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that
prosecutorial comments were made in direct response to defense contention that
government had suborned perjury from witness); see also United States v. Smith,
962 F.2d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing prosecutor's strong indication to jury
that he had done nothing wrong after defense counsel suggested possibility of gov-
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ments in closing argument had sought to bolster the credibility of two of
its chief witnesses, each of whom had struck plea deals to avoid prosecution, and each of whom in turn testified against their defendant co-conspirators. 70 In response to a defense motion for a mistrial after the
comments about the pleas were made to the jury, the Government argued
that the suggestions were made in response to a defense contention that
the witnesses' guilty pleas made the witnesses more likely to lie. 7 1 The
trial court agreed with the Government and denied the motion for mistrial, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the defense had not
made any direct personal attacks on the government or other law enforcement officials. 72 Rather, the Third Circuit concluded that the prosecutor
in Dispoz-O-Plastic had used the invited response doctrine in an offensive
73
manner.
III.

UNITED STATES V. WOOD: THE THIRD CIRCUIT EXTENDS
CALDWELL BEYOND THE FORUM OF CAPITAL CASES

A.

74

Facts and Procedure

On January 10, 2004, a group of men wearing dark clothes attempted
to rob a Pep Boys store on Market Street in West Philadelphia. 75 The
ernment suborning perjury from witness); United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128,
136-37 (7th Cir. 1972) (noting prosecutorial response to defense counsel's specific
charges that FBI agents and other government officials had suborned perjury from
witnesses during trial).
70. See Dispoz-O-Plastics,172 F.3d at 280 (noting prosecutor's comments during closing argument concerning price fixing testimony by chief witnesses). The
prosecutor's exact comments were:
Common sense tells you people don't confess to a crime, they don't turn
a completely innocent, legitimate business meeting into a crime, they
don't confess to crimes they didn't commit and that's what the defendants are trying to tell you they did.... Why would [the witnesses] say they
fixed prices at LaGuardia? Why would they tell that to the Government,
wh[y] would they tell that to the judge who sentenced them?
Id.
71. See id. (recognizing basis of Government's contention that arguments
were proper).
72. See id. at 285 (holding remarks concerning plea bargaining of key government witnesses were improper because they had not come in response to specific
direct attack on government or law enforcement officers).
73. See id. (holding that prosecutor's statements had launched affirmative attack on defense counsel rather than invited response to defense comments).
74. According to Third Circuit precedent, the facts in each case must be
presented in the light most favorable to the Government on an appeal by the
defendant. See, e.g., Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1087 (establishing manner in which
facts must be presented before Third Circuit for opinions).
75. See United States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing
events that gave rise to defendant's trial). The address 4101 Market Street is in
West Philadelphia, which lies within the Philadelphia Police Department's 16th
District. See Philadelphia Police Department 16th District, Police Unit Profiles,
http://www.ppdonline.org/hq-profile-dsl6.php (last visited Feb. 4, 2008) (setting
out boundaries of 16th Police District in Philadelphia, including site of robbery in
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robbers ordered the store's employees to the ground at gunpoint. 76 Unbeknownst to the robbers, however, two uniformed Philadelphia police
officers in an adjacent parking lot had quickly realized a robbery was occurring.7 7 Officer Martin Demota chased the robbers after they fired
shots at him; eventually, Officer Demota set his sights on one fleeing
heavy-set individual. 78 After losing sight of the suspect for roughly five
seconds, Officer Demota was able to catch up to the suspect and place him
under arrest. 79 The individual, identified as the defendant Shaheed
Wood, was indicted on one count of robbery, one count of conspiracy to
commit robbery and one count of using and carrying a firearm during the
80
commission of a crime of violence.
present case). The 16th and other districts in West Philadelphia are notoriously
high crime areas within the city of Philadelphia proper. See Part Five: Community
Facilities and Services, http://parmers.upenn.edu/wp/plan/part5-5.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008) (characterizing crime in West Philadelphia as important issue
and proposing solutions to solve its problem of violent crime).
76. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 783 (noting robbers' use of firearms to subdue Pep
Boys employees at scene).
77. See id. at 784 (recounting officers' behavior and positioning during commission of robbery). One of the robbers had yelled the phrase "one time" while
the robbery was occurring. See id. (describing phrase officers heard from within
store). Officer Demota immediately recognized the phrase as a slang term often
used to signal a police presence in the area. See id. (discussing Officer Demota's
understanding of slang term in context of robbery).
78. See id. (noting sound of gunfire during robbers' conflict with police and
Officer Demota's subsequent response to gun shots). The suspect fled the scene
after realizing the police were in the area; he was attempting to follow a thinner
individual who had also emerged from the Pep Boys. See id. (recounting that two
individuals started to flee from scene and Officer Demota decided to follow more
heavy-set person). The thinner man was able to escape from the police officers.
See id. (describing thinner suspect's success in evading arrest).
79. See id. (noting failure to locate heavy-set suspect for short period of time
and subsequent recognition and arrest of same suspect). Officer Demota's loss of
sight of the individual would become part of the defendant Wood's case theory at
trial of mistaken identity. For further discussion of the defendant's case theory,
and the manner in which it affected the closing arguments in the case, see infra
notes 81-87 and accompanying text. See generally Oliva v. Commonwealth, 452
S.E.2d 877, 879 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing use of mistaken identity by defendant during forcible rape trial); David McCord, "But Perry Mason Made it Look So
Easy!": The Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a CriminalDefendant to Suggest that Someone Else is Guilty, 63 TENN. L. REv. 917, 961-62 (1996) (discussing effectiveness and
widespread use of theory suggesting that individual other than defendant is responsible for crime); Calvin TerBeek, A Callfor PrecedentialHeads: Why the Supreme
Court's Eyewitness IdentificationJurisprudence is Anachronistic and Out-of-Step With the
Empirical Reality, 31 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 21, 21-22 (2007) (pointing out that flaws
in eyewitness identification testimony have led many innocent defendants to guilty
verdicts and posing suggestions for improvement of eyewitness identification
testimony).
80. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 784 (describing superseding indictment returned by
federal grand jury in Eastern District of Pennsylvania). The grand jury handed
down an initial indictment of Wood in July, 2004; the superseding indictment was
returned on March 9, 2005. See id. at n.2 (noting initial indictment date and superseding indictment date). For the charges that Wood was indicted on, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (a) (1994) (criminalizing "interference with interstate commerce by rob-
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At trial, Wood's defense attorneys vigorously questioned Officer
Demota's ability to identify Wood as one of the persons who had robbed
the store.8 1 The defense pointed specifically to the lighting of the area
surrounding the store in an attempt to discredit Officer Demota's conclusion that Wood had committed the robbery. 82 The defense also sought to
83
portray Officer Demota as having been excited after being fired upon.
The prosecutor, however, had ample evidence to support the argument
for Wood's guilt-even the Third Circuit referred to certain evidence con84
cerning an automobile left at the scene as "highly incriminating."
At closing argument, the defense continued to address the major issue of Officer Demota's identification of the defendant, by drawing attention to perceived inconsistencies in the officer's testimony.8 5 Wood's
bery") and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1951) (criminalizing "use of firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence"). Wood was also indicted on one charge of conspiracy;
this was in relation to § 1951(a). See Wood, 486 F.3d at 783 (noting one count on
superseding indictment for "conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by
robbery").
81. See id. at 784 (discussing defense case theory attempting to undermine
Demota's assertion that defendant was heavy-set man he followed out of Pep Boys
store ).
82. See id. (focusing on defense contention that lighting in area would make it
difficult for Demota to identify Pep Boys store robber). In cases where identification of the crime's perpetrator is an important issue, especially when the crime was
committed during nighttime hours, defendants regularly argue that the lighting in
the area made it difficult for the true perpetrator to be recognized. Cf Katherine
R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's New Government Experiment, 2006
Wis. L. REv. 645, 645-46 (2006) (discussing eyewitness identification problems as
major "dysfunction" in investigation as well as prosecution of crimes).
83. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 784 (discussing defendant's assertion that Demota
was acting with "excited state-of-mind" after having been shot at by fleeing individuals). The defense theory was that this excitement caused Demota to lose sight of
the heavy-set man he intended to follow, which was thus an indication that he
could not identify the suspect with particularity. See id. (discussing implications of
defense theory).
84. See id. (referring to particular evidence as "highly incriminating"). The
prosecutor put forth a mountain of evidence, much of which tended to improve
the jury's view of Demota's credibility. See id. (noting prosecution attempts to bolster credibility of Officer Demota). Among the evidence presented were a surveillance video that captured images of the two men who had robbed the store, a
black jacket recovered from Wood that was similar to what the surveillance tapes
showed the heavy-set man to be wearing at the scene and Demota's ability to identify Wood as the robber from the surveillance tape. See id. (listing evidence used at
trial in order to bolster Demota's credibility for jury). In addition, there was evidence of a gold 1997 Oldsmobile near the Pep Boys store that belonged to Wood's
girlfriend and "for which Wood had the only set of keys." See id. at 794-95 (noting
evidence of automobile near crime scene that court described as "highly incriminating"). Furthermore, after performing a search of the automobile, police recovered a receipt with Wood's name on it as well as a gun holster. See id. (noting items
found by police officers during search incident to Wood's arrest).
85. See id. (discussing continued defense suggestion that particular case was
one of mistaken identity). It is important for each side to convey a theme during
closing argument, weaving in relevant evidence presented during trial, in order to
communicate the most persuasive message to the jury. See H. Mitchell Caldwell et
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attorney argued that "[Officer Demota] very well could have been mistaken as to what Mr. Wood might have said" at the time of the arrest, and
that-given the stress of the situation-Officer Demota was also mistaken
about where he was when shots were fired at him. 86 Wood's attorney
continued:
I say to you, members of the jury, that no one saw Shaheed Wood
drive that car to that location, that no one saw Mr. Wood get out
of that car ....

[A Government witness] got up here and had the

gumption to tell you that we didn't have to examine evidence
because [the Government] had a case against this man .... Well,
that belies common sense. You know ... how many people on
death row have been let off with the discovery of DNA evidence
that says that they are innocent? Surely, the cops in that case
87
thought they had the right guy.
Given the final opportunity to argue in rebuttal, the prosecutor in
Wood sought to cast doubt upon the defense's theory of mistaken identity
by asserting that "mistakes happen."8 8 The prosecutor attempted to ingrain in the minds of the jurors the notion that mistakes happen all too
frequently, repeating the phrase "mistake" several times throughout the
al., The Art and Architecture of Closing Argument, 76 TULANE L. REv. 961, 970 (2002)
(emphasizing necessity of theme development during closing argument as important goal for effective persuasion ofjury); Stephen D. Easton, Cashingin Your Credibility DuringFinalArgument, 46 APR. FED. LAw. 30, 31 (1999) (noting that decision
about trial theme is one to be made long before trial begins and theme should be
developed further in closing argument). Theme is such an important goal to certain advocates that some unorthodox methods are frequently used to cement it in
the jurors' minds. See, e.g., Gene Curtis, Only in Oklahoma: Defense Attorney Had a
Colorful Legacy, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 16, 2007, available at http://www.tulsaworld.
corn (follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink; then set date for Jan. 16, 2007 and
search "Gene Curtis") (providing account of attorney's argument that defendant
acted in self-defense and jurors would do same, culminating in attorney drawing
two pistols to illustrate point).
86. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 785 (noting defense attorney's arguments concerning Demota's purported identification issues before and during arrest).
87. Id. The defense attorney went on to conclude that the evidence taken
from Wood's automobile and from his person (including the jacket), as well as the
assertions made by Officer Demota in pursuing the fleeing robber, were inconsistent with any potential involvement in the robbery. See id. (describing conclusions
drawn by defense attorney during closing argument). The comment concerning
exculpatory DNA evidence, however, was one that became a focal point for the
Government during oral argument before the Third Circuit. For a discussion of
each party's position during oral argument before the Third Circuit, see infra
notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
88. See id. (asserting that defense theme lacked significance given frequency
of mistakes). Specifically, the prosecutor argued: "Was Officer Demota accurate
about what Shaheed Wood said[?] . . . You heard the officer's screams. He was
extremely agitated and excited and mistakes happen. Of course, they can happen." Id.
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closing argument.8 9 Finally, the prosecutor made the following statement
that became the disputed remark in this case: "[T]hat's how human nature is. I can't explain it but that's what it is. We all make mistakes. Government agents make mistakes, police officers make mistakes, citizens
90
make mistakes, judges make mistakes, that's why we have courts of appeals."
Wood's attorney immediately objected to these statements and moved
91
Thejury then went
for a mistrial, but the trial judge denied the motion.
on to convict Wood on all counts, and the judge imposed concurrent
sentences of 120 months for the first two counts of robbery and conspiracy
to commit robbery to run consecutively to a 120-month sentence for the
92
third count of using a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.
Wood appealed both his conviction and his sentence to the Third
Circuit.

93

89. See id. (noting prosecutor's frequent reference to phrase "mistake" and
emphasis on regularity of mistakes being made by several different members of
society).
90. Id. at 785-86 (emphasis added). This was the portion of the prosecutor's
argument that mirrored those mentioned in Caldwell and Riley. For a discussion of
closing argument comments made in these cases and similar ones made in certain
other cases, see supra notes 32-73 and accompanying text.
91. See id. at 786 (discussing defense attorney's immediate objection to prosecutor's assertions). The defense attorney strenuously argued that the prosecutor's
statements might "'somehow lead this jury to believe that if they make a mistake
•

.

.

that, somehow, the Court of Appeals can

correct that mistake,'

thus

'minimiz[ing] in the jury's mind the gravity of the responsibility to get [the verdict] right."' Id. The trial judge considered such argument before concluding
that the court's "'instructions to the jury will more than adequately direct them to
their purpose in their deliberations and not that they're to make mistakes for
somebody else to clean up."' Id.; see also Neil P. Cohen, The Timing ofJuy Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 682 (2000) (noting purpose of jury instructions is to
aid jury in completing its "factfinding duties" and categorizing different types of
jury instructions according to more specialized function).
92. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 786 (referring to sentence given to defendant by
districtjudge). The sentence given to Wood was a stringent one-it reflected a sixlevel enhancement because the trial judge found that his actions created a "substantial risk of serious bodily injury to [Officer] Demota." See id.; see also UNITED
STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.2(c) (2004) (providing for upward
enhancement if defendant is found to have acted in manner that posed risk of
serious bodily injury to another individual). In order to apply this enhancement,
the trial judge needed to find this additional fact by a preponderance of the evidence, and the resulting sentence could not exceed the statutory maximum sentence applied to these crimes. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000) (holding that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt"). The Third Circuit considered the sentence in its opinion in
Wood and remanded the case back to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for reconsideration of the sentence. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 789-91 (discussing error in
sentence given to defendant and concluding sentence was inappropriate). The
court's holding as to Wood's sentence, however, is not the focus of this Casebrief
and is an issue apart from this discussion.
93. See id. at 786 (noting defendant's challenge of both verdict and sentence
in Third Circuit).
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The Third Circuit's Opinion

After hearing arguments stemming from Wood's appeal, a threejudge panel for the Third Circuit unanimously affirmed Wood's conviction. 94 The court did so by finding that the prosecutor's reference to the
appellate process in closing argument amounted to harmless error in the
context of the case; thus, reversal and remand was unnecessary. 95 Despite
its decision, the Third Circuit in Wood strongly condemned the prosecutor's statements made during the trial, and warned that such an argument
96
in the future might infringe on the holdings in Caldwell and its progeny.

1.

The Parties' Arguments

On appeal, Wood's attorneys forcefully argued that the statements in
the prosecutor's closing arguments should have led the district judge to
grant his motion for a mistrial. 97 They stressed that "[a] remark by the
prosecutor in the course of his closing argument to the jury.., that if the
jurors make a mistake in the verdict, some other tribunal will correct it, is
improper."9 8 According to Wood's attorneys, such a statement would
tend "to influence [the jurors] to shift the burden of their responsibility
from themselves to an appellate court." 99
94. See id. at 791 (affirming defendant's conviction by unanimous decision).
In order to hear the case, the Third Circuit properly exercised federal appellate
jurisdiction after Wood had appealed his conviction. See id. at 786 (providing for
proper exercise of appellate jurisdiction pursuant to federal statute); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) ("The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States."). In addition,
because Wood challenged his sentence, the Third Circuit also needed to exercise
appropriate jurisdiction to be able to consider the sentence. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a) (2007) ("A defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court for
review of an otherwise final sentence."). For further discussion of the Third Circuit's rationale for affirming Wood's conviction, see infra notes 106-23 and accompanying text.
95. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 789 (concluding that any error in trial that resulted
from prosecutor's statement about appellate process could not have affected verdict in case and was thus harmless).
96. See id. (emphasizing that referencing appellate court function can be dangerous for trial attorney). For further discussion of why the Third Circuit found
that such argument might be dangerous in closing arguments, see infra notes 12430 and accompanying text.
97. See id. at 786 (discussing Wood's major contentions during oral argument
before Third Circuit).
98. Id. The Third Circuit would go on to agree with Wood's contention but
qualify that agreement in the context of this case. For further discussion of why
the Third Circuit treated the prosecutor's comments as improper, and the framework that it used in order to evaluate those comments, see infra notes 114-23 and
accompanying text.
99. Id. Wood relied primarily on two state cases in support of his contention
that the prosecutor's remark was improper. See id. at 787 (noting two cases upon
which defendant premised his argument were Johnson v. Maryland, 601 A.2d 1093
(1992) and People v. Rutledge, 578 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1992)). In Johnson, the prosecutor had made this statement, which the Maryland Court of Appeals deemed
improper:
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In response to this argument, the Government invoked the invited
response doctrine to defend the prosecutor's remarks. 100 It argued that
the opportunity to use the doctrine arose when Wood's attorney mentioned that defendants had been exonerated after trial because of later
findings of DNA evidence.' 0 1 This type of statement, according to the
Government, was "clearly intended" to persuade "the jury to decide to ac02
quit based on uncertain[ty] caused by the results in different cases."'

Let me just tell you ladies and gentlemen a couple of things that bothered me about what my learned friend has said. She said that when you
go back there and you come up with a verdict you can't change your
minds, make sure, make sure. She wants to elevate reasonable doubt
more than it is in your minds. Well, let me tell you ladies and gentlemen,
if your verdict is not guilty you can't change it. If it is guilty it is reviewed
by the appellate [court] .. .[a] nd the rights of the appeal go all the way
up to the Supreme Court. So what she is telling you, saying that to you,
she is not being quite honest to you. She wants to elevate that reasonable
doubt in your mind which is what her job is to make it harder for you all
to find him guilty.
Johnson, 601 A.2d at 1093-94 (quoting prosecutor's argument in rebuttal to defense
attorney's contentions during closing argument). The Johnson court placed considerable weight on the fact that the prosecutor argued that defense counsel had
attempted to "elevate reasonable doubt more than it is in the jurors' minds." See
id. at 1096 (emphasizing portion of improper statement made by prosecutor).
Furthermore, the court determined that the jury might incorrectly infer from the
prosecutor's argument that if it returned a guilty verdict, the verdict would not be
final. See id. (noting possibility that jury might be improperly swayed by prosecutor's statements). As a result, the court found that the statement implied that the
jurors did not need to be concerned about convicting the defendant. See id. (concluding that improper implication followed from prosecutor's argument to jury).
In Rutledge, the second case upon which Wood relied, the prosecutor told the
jury "that as 'sophisticated New Yorkers, you know there's an appeal process ... to
safeguard that defendant's rights.... So a verdict of guilty is not final and you
need not agonize in this case [sic] there is nothing to agonize over ....' Rutledge,
578 N.Y.S.2d at 163. On appeal, the Government admitted that the statement during closing argument was improper; its only argument was that defense counsel
had made a procedural error in objecting to the statement that would thus prevent
reversal of the defendant's conviction. See id. (noting Government's argument
that defendant's general objection to statement was insufficient to preserve defendant's claim on appeal). The court rejected the Government's argument and thus
used the improper statements as grounds for reversal of the defendant's conviction. See id. (concluding that statement presented serious possibility of prejudice
to defendant).
100. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 788 (recounting Government's argument that invited response applied to remarks made during closing argument at trial).
101. See id. (considering Government's argument that defense counsel had
invited prosecutor's apparently improper reply through contention that DNA evidence has in past provided for exoneration of previously convicted defendants).
102. Id. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's response to the Government's contention that this statement invited the prosecutor's response, see infra
notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
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The Third Circuit'sRationale
The Wood court first referred to the Caldwell framework in the third

paragraph of its discussion. 10 3 Before undertaking any discussion of its
own holding, the court emphasized that "comments tending to lead a jury
to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a
defendant's sentence lies with an authority other than the jury are inappropriate." 10 4 This assumption set an immediate tone that, in deciding
this case, the Third Circuit was unwilling to accept this type of
0 5
prosecutorial argument as appropriate.'
For all its reservations toward the prosecutor's argument, however,
the Third Circuit was unanimous in deciding to affirm Wood's conviction.' 0 6 The court noted that a "presumption of correctness" typically attaches to a verdict when considered on appeal. 10 7 As a result, a jury
103. See id. at 787 (recognizing applicability of Caldwell framework to case at
bar).
104. Id. (citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985)). The
cited language in the case is found not only in the text of Caldwell; the court also
cited to similar language in Riley. See Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 298 (3d Cir.
2001) (en banc) ("[A] Caldwell violation may be established where a technically
accurate statement describing the state appellate review process nonetheless 'misled the jury to minimize its role in the sentencing process."' (quoting Driscoll v.
Delo, 71 F.3d 701, 713 (8th Cir. 1995))).
105. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's indignation with this statement and its conclusion that such a statement might not always be proper during
closing arguments, see supra notes 94-96 and infra notes 124-30, and accompanying
text.
106. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 791 (affirming judgment of conviction for
defendant).
107. See id. at 787 (recognizing verdict found by jury is entitled to basic presumption of correctness in appellate determination); see also Caldwell, 472 U.S. at
330-31 (discussing presumption of correctness that normally applies in spite of
potentially inappropriate comments made by attorneys). This presumption of correctness standard is applied in many federal circuits and state courts. See, e.g.,
Caldwell v. Bell, 288 F.3d 838, 845 (6th Cir. 2002) (Norris, J., dissenting) (citing
Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1998)) (noting that presumption of
finality and validity attaches to conviction); Int'l Rehabilitation Assocs., Inc. v. Adams, 613 So.2d 1207, 1214 (Ala. 1992) (noting that "strong presumption of correctness attaches to a jury verdict in Alabama"); Peterson v. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co., 164 N.W.2d 621, 628 n.1 (Minn. 1969) ("[T]he presumption of correctness which attaches to the verdict precludes any speculation as to whether the
jury might in fact have based its verdict on some conclusion that is not supported
by the evidence." (quoting Petron v. Waldo, 139 N.W.2d 484, 490 (Minn. 1965)));
see also Paramount Pest Control Serv. v. Brewer, 177 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1949)
(holding that presumption of correctness ought to attach to district court's findings); Butler v. State, 23 S.E.2d 263, 264 (Ga. Ct. App. 1942) (declaring that sense
of sanctity and validity should apply to formal judgments rendered in Georgia
courts); Delashmutt v. McCoy, 176 N.W. 682, 682 (Iowa 1920) (recognizing that
presumption of correcmess generally attaches to jury verdict). But see Lowe v. City
of St. Louis, 843 F.2d 1158, 1159 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that no presumption of
correctness is given to district court's finding of directed verdict). Additionally, in
federal civil cases, a trial court's findings are not to be set aside unless they are
found to be clearly erroneous. See FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a) (6) (providing for clearly
erroneous standard of review of trial court findings).
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verdict normally will not be "destroyed by comments from the prosecutor
misstating the jury's role in the judicial process."10 8
Having recognized the applicability of the presumption of correctness
for a verdict, the Wood court was not convinced that the prosecutor's remarks were inappropriate. 10 9 The court held that it was unclear whether
the statement had any tendency to affect the jury's sense of responsibility
for its own verdict. 110 Important to this determination was that the prosecutor's disputed reference to the appellate function immediately followed
his comment that judges can make mistakes."' The court found that the
order of these remarks made it "logical to believe that the jury would have
understood the prosecutor's comment as relating to the functions of the
trial judge and not the jury."1 12 The fact that the prosecutor did not mention juries among the group of entities whom he claimed tend to make
11 3
mistakes was also significant to the court's determination.
The court did, however, treat the prosecutor's remarks as inappropriate for the purposes of its analysis and thus had to determine whether the
Government could permissibly use the invited response doctrine tojustify
it. 1 14 Relying on the holding in Dispoz-O-Plasticsthat the Government may
not use invited response offensively, the Wood court held that the contention that Wood's attorney invited the response when the attorney mentioned DNA exoneration belied an "unduly broad" reading of the
doctrine." 1 5 The court determined that in referring to DNA evidence, defense counsel had simply sought to emphasize the importance of gather108. Wood, 486 F.3d at 787.
109. See id. at 786-87 (noting that court would treat statement as appropriate
for purposes of its opinion but was not automatically convinced that prosecutor's
arguments were inappropriate).
110. See id. at 787 (recognizing potential that prosecutor's statement had little
to no effect on jury's sense of its own responsibilities).
111. See id. (discussing natural order of prosecutor's argument and determining its potential effect in context of inappropriate statement).
112. Id.
113. See id. (noting prosecutor's refraining from discussion of juries making
mistakes that might be correctable by courts of appeal). During closing argument,
the prosecutor had referred to governments, police officers, citizens and judges as
being prone to mistakes. See id. at 785-86 (listing entities whose mistakes prosecutor believed may be corrected by courts of appeal). For further discussion of the
individuals and entities prone to mistakes that the prosecutor mentioned during
closing argument, see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
114. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 788 (stating that court would treat prosecutor's
remark as inappropriate for balance of its opinion and consider Government's
argument of applicability of invited response doctrine). For further discussion of
the invited response doctrine, see supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the Government's rationale that the invited response doctrine applied in this case, see supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
115. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 788 (deciding that Government could not use invited response doctrine to justify its argument and respond to remarks concerning
exoneration of defendants through subsequently discovered DNA evidence); see
also United States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, 172 F.3d 275, 284-85 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting
that invited response cannot be used as "springboard" for affirmative attacks to be
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ing evidence for later investigation, and was not launching an attack on
the prosecutor.1 16 Furthermore, the court concluded that there had been
no showing by the Government on appeal that Wood's attorney had "predicated" the summation upon arguments that had no basis in evidence
presented at trial.117 The court therefore found that the invited response
1 18
doctrine did not apply.
Because it treated the prosecutor's statement as potentially inappropriate, the Wood court was required to examine the remark in the context
of several factors present in the trial, in order to determine whether the
district court should have granted a mistrial.1 19 One major factor impacting the court's view was that the disputed comment was a mere sentence in the prosecutor's entire closing argument.' 20 Similarly, the
appellate court noted that the district court had given an express instruction to the jury that "opening and closing statements made by counsel
were not considered evidence," and that the jury was only allowed to
ground its verdict on the basis of the evidence presented. 121 Finally, the
court emphatically stated that there was a substantial amount of evidence
launched on defense counsel). For further discussion of the facts and holding in
Dispoz-O-Plastics,see supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
116. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 788 (discussing interpretation of defense counsel's
contentions during closing argument); cf United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d
1355, 1364-66 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that defense attorney's insinuation that Government suborned perjury from witnesses was enough to provide opportunity to
use invited response); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1126-27 (3d Cir.
1990) (concluding that defense counsel's personal attack on integrity of prosecutor and law enforcement officers constituted appropriate instance for Government
to use invited response doctrine).
117. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 788-89 (noting that nothing could make court view
defense counsel's statements as making concerted attack on prosecutor or prosecutor's case).
118. See id. at 789 (holding that invited response doctrine could not apply in
present case).
119. See United States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[A] mistrial
is not required where improper remarks were harmless, considering their scope,
their relation to the context of the trial, the ameliorative effect of any curative
instructions and the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.").
120. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 789 (noting that objectionable statement in prosecutor's closing argument was relegated to one sentence within entire summation).
121. Id. Besides giving this instruction, the district judge also instructed the
jury to carefully and impartially consider all evidence and reach a just verdict. See
id. at n.4 (discussing further instructions given by districtjudge). Thejudge closed
his instructions with this comment:
As jurors, your role is to resolve and decide the factual issues in this case.
You are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts[,] you decide upon the
weight of the evidence. You determine the credibility of witnesses. You
resolvesuch conflicts as there may be in the evidence, and you draw such
reasonable inferences as may be warranted by the testimony or exhibits in
the case.
Id.; see also A. Leo Levin & Robert J. Levy, Persuadingthe Juy With Facts Not in Evidence: The Fiction-ScienceSpectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 144 (1956) (noting that
impropriety is present where counsel attempts to interject and establish material
facts during course of argument that had not been established during trial).
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presented against Wood at trial. 12 2 Therefore, the court was "certain behave
yond any possible doubt that the prosecutor's comment could not
12 3
affected the verdict" and affirmed Wood's conviction accordingly.
Nevertheless, in arriving at their conclusion, the Third Circuit judges
1 24
The
expressed considerable disdain for the prosecutor's comments.
panel expressly acknowledged its disapproval of similar comments in other
closing arguments, and stated that "it would have been better" if the prosecutor had refrained from making the questionable comment during the
trial. 125 Furthermore, in ending its review of the remark, the court
warned prosecutors that references to the appellate process similar to the
one made in Wood's trial could constitute reversible error in certain
12 6
circumstances.
Most importantly, the Third Circuit drew on the Caldwell rule
127
throughout its opinion in order to apply the rule to non-capital cases.
It cited the capital cases of Caldwell and Riley early in its discussion and
stated:
Even though arguments regarding the shifting of responsibility
for the outcome in a criminal case appear to arise most often on
appeals of sentences in capital cases, "state-induced suggestions
that the sentencing jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an
appellate court" similarly have no place in cases where a defen128
dant may be sentenced to a punishment other than death.
Using this framework, the court felt comfortable enough to declare that
the notion that prosecutors ought to refrain from attempting to alter the
jury's sense of responsibility applies to the determination of guilt or inno129
In closing, the court
cence as well as the sentencing determination.
emphasized that "reference in an argument to the review function of the
122. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 789 (concluding that "there is simply no doubt that
Wood is guilty").
123. Id.
124. See generally id. at 786-89 (discussing general disregard for closing arguments that improperly reference appellate process).
125. See id. at 787-88 (admonishing prosecutor for argument during trial and
indicating that more proper argument could have been made).
126. See id. at 789 (concluding that this instance of inappropriate comment
failed to yield reversal but cautioning that future transgressions in same area may
lead to reversible trial error).
127. See id. at 787-89 (referencing applicability of Caldwell rule to factual situation at bar).
128. Id. at 787 (emphasis added); see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,
330 (1985) (concluding that Government's suggestions to jury that appellate process plays role in its decision may alter jury's sense of responsibility for its own
decision).
129. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 787 (noting applicability of Caldwell rule to guilt or
innocence phase of trial as well as penalty phase).
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courts of appeals may be dangerous territory into which a prosecutor
130
should venture with care."
IV.

WOOD'S IMPACT ON CLOSING ARGUMENT IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT

With this decision, the Third Circuit did not establish a "bright-line"
rule that forbids referring to the appellate process during closing arguments. 13 The decision did, however, declare that such references in non1 32
capital cases will be heavily scrutinized under the Caldwell framework.
As such, the Third Circuit has left open the possibility that Caldwell can
apply outside the capital arena and thus can serve as the basis for reversing
133
a conviction.
The Third Circuit's ruling in Wood emphasizes an important area that
prosecutors would be wise to avoid in closing arguments.13 4 Not only does
the potential for reversal loom, but the mere mention of a court of appeal
during closing argument could also unnecessarily confuse a jury into believing that the prospect of appellate review makes its decision less binding
or important, which could ultimately have an impact on its decision.1 35 In
closing argument in a non-capital trial, eliminating any reference to an
appellate court ensures that the jury's focus remains on the evidence
presented during the trial and on any inferences that can be drawn solely
on the basis of that evidence. 13 6 Furthermore, the Wood decision seems to
130. Id. at 789.
131. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 205 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "bright-line
rule" as "[a] legal rule of decision that tends to resolve issues, esp [ecially] ambiguities, simply and straightforwardly, sometimes sacrificing equity for certainty"). For
a Third Circuit case in which a bright-line rule was established, see In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997) (establishing Third
Circuit's bright-line rule regarding disclosure omission under Securities Exchange
Act of 1934).

132. For further discussion of the Caldwell opinion and the rule that it set
forth, see supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
133. For further discussion of the holding in United States v. Wood and the
manner in which it applied the rule announced in Caldwell, see supra notes 94-130
and accompanying text.
134. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 789 (warning practitioners about danger of discussing appellate role in trial process during closing argument).
135. See generally John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on
Guilty Pleas to Aid CriminalJuror Comprehension, 39 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1187, 1201-04
(2002) (discussing research to determine sources of juror confusion and recommendations for lessening criminal jury confusion in future). Closing arguments
are not always the major reason why a juror or several jurors in a trial become
confused; often, this distinction belongs to the judge's instructions and the jurors'
inability to decipher or remember them. See id. at 1202 (noting that confusion
may result from difficulty in remembering charges or instructions from court); see
also Drum v. Shaull Equip. & Supply Co., 760 A.2d 5, 9-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)
(noting several jurors' misunderstandings of terms "substantial" and "negligence"
as they applied to decision and subsequent verdict).
136. See Peter W. Agnes, Jr., An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: A
CollaborativeApproach to Eliminate Improper Closing Arguments, 87 MASs. L. REv. 33, 42
(2002) (noting attorney's role to keep closing argument focused on only that evi-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss4/3

24

20081

Lyon: Avoiding the Woodshed: The Third Circuit Examines Prosecutorial M
CASEBRIEF

713

disfavor use of the invited response doctrine-an otherwise important
prosecutorial tool for closing arguments-to justify references to the appellate process. 1 37 The Third Circuit most likely will be unwilling to hold
that invited response is a viable approach for asserting any comment about
courts of appeal unless the defense attorney launches an affirmative attack
138
on the prosecutor or a key government witness.
Completely avoiding any reference to the appellate process is certainly the best way for a prosecutor to sidestep the type of scrutiny that the
court applied to the statement in Wood.' 39 There still remains, however,
the goal of making jurors feel more at ease with their decisions; finding a
defendant guilty in a non-capital arena can still prove to be a significantly
stressful exercise. 140 If prosecutors seek to ease the burden on the jurors,
they should avoid referring to appellate review, and instead discuss the
strength in numbers that jurors possess, in that all of the jurors together
dence which has been admitted at trial). The judge also plays an important role in
keeping extraneous matters from being heard by the jury by ensuring that parties
do not make improper closing arguments. See id. (emphasizing judge's role in
closing argument proceedings).
137. For a discussion of why the Government argued that the invited response
doctrine applied to the prosecutor's comments during closing argument at
Wood's trial, see supranotes 100-02 and accompanying text. For further discussion
of why the Third Circuit held that the invited response doctrine was inapplicable
to the Wood decision, see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
138. Compare United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1365-66 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that invited response was appropriate for prosecutorial remark after defense counsel had referred to government witness as "perjurer," "murderer," "robber" and "burglar"), with Wood, 486 F.3d at 788-89 (holding that invited response
was inappropriate for prosecutorial reference to appellate court role in correcting
mistakes after defense counsel remarked that DNA evidence had been used to
clear previously convicted criminals).
139. For a discussion of why the Third Circuit frowned upon the prosecutor's
statement in closing argument during Wood's trial, see supra notes 94-96 and 12430, and accompanying text.
140. See Monica K. Miller et al., JurorStress: Causes and Interventions, 30 T. MARSHALL. L. Rrv. 237, 239 (2004) (noting that jurors tend to feel stress at every stage
of jury duty). An evidentiary study showed that a sample of jurors felt at least a
moderate level of stress during different stages ofjury duty, from summons to verdict and dismissal. See id. (reportingjuror stress levels in response to several potential stress factors associated with jury duty). The survey found that 44% of criminal
trial jurors included in the sample indicated being stressed about having to make a
decision that might falsely convict an innocent defendant or that might tend to let
a guilty defendant go free. See id. at 240 (noting percentage ofjurors who experience stress during deliberations). Another important stress factor was being able
to arrive with fellow jurors on a unanimous verdict-49% of the jurors indicated
that they felt stress because of this factor. See id. (affirming stress felt due to necessity of unanimous verdict). The issue ofjuror stress is rampant enough that counseling may be offered to those who may have become traumatized after serving on
ajury. See, e.g., Leigh B. Bienen, HelpingJurorsOut: Post-Verdict DebriefingforJurors in
Emotionally Disturbing Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1333, 1350 (1993) (discussing stress debriefing treatment for those jurors who have served in particularly emotional
trials).
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arrive at a unanimous verdict.' 41 This would provide an alternative basis
for jury reassurance that would more than likely avoid Caldwell and Wood

scrutiny. 142
V.

CONCLUSION

Prosecutors have an important job in our society: they must explore
all possible avenues to see that justice is accomplished on behalf of American citizens. 1 43 They have a specific duty to protect at all costs the people
whom they serve while at the same time ensuring that criminals are appropriately brought to bear for their crimes. 144 Such a rigorous job is constantly recognized as inherently difficult given the pressures that many
45
prosecutors must face from citizens and governmental entities alike.1
Thus, given the importance of closing arguments to a trial, prosecutors
should continue to be afforded a deferential standard as to what they are
46
allowed to say in their final remarks to the jury.'
141. See United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 979 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting
defendant's objection to prosecutor's statement under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472
U.S. 320 (1985)). InJohnson, the prosecutor made this statement, which the defendant subsequently argued had diminished the jury's sense of responsibility for its
decision: "And if you choose the death penalty, you choose it as a group. It doesn't
rest on the shoulders of any one of you. There's courage in numbers." Id. The
Eighth Circuit held that such comments were not improper under Caldwell and
instead made the jurors feel more comfortable about their upcoming decision by
reminding them that they were undergoing the process as a collective group. See
id. (concluding that prosecutor's argument was proper under circumstances).
142. See Wood, 486 F.3d at 787 (discussing applicability of Caldwell to prosecutor's closing argument during trial).
143. See Robert W. Clifford, Identifying and Preventing Improper Prosecutorial
Comment in Closing Argument, 51 ME. L. REv. 241, 258 (1999) (defining primary
responsibility of prosecutor as duty "to see that justice is accomplished"). In Clifford's eyes, the prosecutor's role is not simply limited to that of an advocate-the
prosecutor also has the responsibility to be a "minister ofjustice." See id. (observing potential dual roles for prosecutors in legal arena).
144. See, e.g.,
Maine v. Ashley, 666 A.2d 103, 105 (Me. 1995) (characterizing
important prosecutorial duty to people); see also Clifford, supra note 143, at 258
(discussing that prosecutors owe duty to people whom they represent and have
duty to ensure that criminals are brought to justice).
145. See Kay L. Levine, Article, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FORE.ST L. REv.
1125, 1174-75 (2005) (discussing difficulties in prosecutor's job). Often prosecutors must act as justice-seekers, protectors of the people and as counselors to injured victims, further adding to their arsenal of responsibilities. See id. at 1175
(noting prosecutors' frequent frustration with having to counsel victims and seek
support for them). Because they take away from courtroom and investigation
time, such counseling sessions have been referred to by prosecutors as "dog and
pony shows." See id. at n.146 (referring to author's interview with local prosecutor
and noting prosecutor's characterization of sessions made before local audiences
concerning counseling and social services).
146. See Nidiry, supra note 4, at 1306 ("By its nature, effective closing argument is designed to persuade the trier of fact. With few exceptions, litigators are
given wide latitude in that persuasion process." (quoting Harry Caldwell, Name
Calling at Trial.-PlacingParameterson the Prosecutor,8 AM. J. TRIAL Avoc. 385, 385
(1985))).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss4/3

26

Lyon: Avoiding the Woodshed: The Third Circuit Examines Prosecutorial M
2008]

CASEBRIEF

Discussing the role of appellate courts in the jury's determination,
147
however, is something best left to a party other than the prosecutor.
The prosecutor's argument is most effective when it focuses the jury on
the trial itself and the evidence presented there. 148 Wading beyond these
parameters into a discussion of appellate review not only takes away from
that focus, but under Wood, may provide potential grounds for a mistrial or
reversal of a conviction. 1 4 9 Although Wood's conviction was upheld, the
Third
Third Circuit's opinion in the case represents a major caution to
1 50
Circuit prosecutors to be wary of making this kind of argument.
Michael Lyon

147. See Walter W. Steele et al., Jury Instructions:A PersistentFailure to Communi-

cate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 77 (1988) (discussing role of judge to instruct jurors on
which duties are theirs and which duties are not assigned to them).
148. See Agnes, supra note 136, at 42 (emphasizing role of prosecutor to keep
closing argument more focused on evidence presented and admitted at trial rather
than on empirical matters).
149. For the decision in Wood, and the possibility that the decision will lead to
reversals and mistrials in the Third Circuit, see supra notes 74-148 and infra note
150 and accompanying text.
150. See United States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2007) (warning
prosecutors to discuss appellate process in closing arguments with care).
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